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ABSTRACT Many studies, both of Australia and of comparable developed
economies, have found that the economic benefits from investment in urban
infrastructure are substantial. However the nature of this infrastructure is often such
that it is under-provided by the private sector.  In Australia, much of the responsibility
for the  provision of urban infrastructure rests with state and local government.
However throughout the 1990’s many of Australia’s state governments embarked on a
period of fiscal restraint, seeking to improve financial positions weakened by
exposure to failed state government enterprises in the early 1990’s. Perhaps because
of the deferred consequences of reducing spending on infrastructure, a large
proportion of this fiscal adjustment appears to have been borne by spending on public
infrastructure. Today, policy attention at the state government level is again focussing
on public infrastructure.  However in spite of the now robust fiscal positions of
Australia’s state governments, there remains a reluctance on their part to finance
public infrastructure through debt, and raising taxes is perceived as politically
unpopular. Instead, governments are exploring alternative financing instruments, such
as developer charges and public-private partnerships.  This paper uses a dynamic
multi-regional CGE model (MMRF) to evaluate the regional macroeconomic
consequences of four alternative methods of financing an expansion in state
government spending on public infrastructure. The four methods are developer
charges, payroll tax, government debt, and residential rates. The paper confirms that
the services provided by public infrastructure can have significant impacts on the
regional macroeconomy.  More importantly however, the paper demonstrates that the
total gains from urban infrastructure are quite sensitive to the means chosen by
government to finance infrastructure investment.  In contrast to up-front financing
methods (such as developer charges, payroll tax, and residential rates), the paper finds
that the gains from urban infrastructure are greatest when the chosen financing
method provides a closer match between the timing of the burden of financing the
infrastructure and the timing of the benefits provided by the infrastructure. This can
be achieved by instruments such as debt, public-private partnerships, and user
charges. On this basis the paper finds that a greater reliance by regional governments
on debt financing might be warranted, and that the gains from infrastructure
expenditure are least when that expenditure is financed by developer charges.3
1. INTRODUCTION
Many studies, both of Australia and of comparable developed economies, have found
that the economic benefits from investment in urban infrastructure are substantial.
However the nature of this infrastructure is often such that it is under-provided by the
private sector.  In Australia, much of the responsibility for the  provision of urban
infrastructure rests with state and local government. However throughout the 1990’s
many of Australia’s state governments embarked on a period of fiscal restraint,
seeking to improve financial positions weakened by exposure to the failed state
government enterprises of the early 1990’s. Perhaps because of the deferred
consequences of reducing spending on infrastructure, a large proportion of this fiscal
adjustment appears to have been borne by spending on public infrastructure. Today,
policy attention at the state government level is again focussing on public
infrastructure.  However in spite of the now robust fiscal positions of Australia’s state
governments, there remains a reluctance on their part to finance public infrastructure
through debt, and raising taxes is perceived as politically unpopular. Instead,
governments are exploring alternative financing instruments, such as developer
charges and public-private partnerships.
This paper uses a dynamic multi-regional CGE model (MMRF) to evaluate the
regional macroeconomic consequences of a program of additional spending on urban
infrastructure. We use MMRF to investigate the regional macroeconomic
consequences of both the construction of the infrastructure and the on-going benefits
that the infrastructure provides.  The paper confirms that the services provided by
public infrastructure can have significant impacts on the regional macroeconomy.
More importantly however, the paper demonstrates that the total gains from urban
infrastructure are quite sensitive to the means chosen by government to finance
infrastructure investment.  We examine four alternative financing methods: developer
charges, payroll tax, debt and residential rates.  In contrast to the up-front financing
methods (developer charges, payroll tax, and residential rates), the paper finds that the
gains from urban infrastructure are greatest when the chosen financing method (such
as debt) provides a closer match between the timing of the burden of financing the
infrastructure and the timing of the benefits provided by the infrastructure. This could
be achieved by instruments such as debt, public-private partnerships, and user
charges. On this basis the paper finds that a greater reliance by regional governments
on debt financing might be warranted, and that the gains from infrastructure
expenditure are least when that expenditure is financed by developer charges.
MMRF is a bottom-up multi-regional model of the Australian economy, featuring
modelling of economic agents within each of Australia’s eight states and territories.
We choose one of these eight regions (the state of New South Wales) for our case
study. The state of NSW accounts for approximately 35 per cent of national GDP and
about 33 per cent of national population. We assume that the state government of
New South Wales (NSW) embarks on a program of additional infrastructure
construction within the state of NSW. This spending program is financed by the NSW
government through either debt, or one of three taxes levied on economic activity
within NSW. The benefits of the new infrastructure are assumed to accrue to
economic agents within NSW.4
That the provision of public infrastructure should provide a gross benefit is
uncontroversial. Spending on infrastructure services such as major and minor roads,
rail, airports, port facilities, water and sewerage, waste collection and disposal, and
communications networks provides ongoing benefits in the form of faster, safer and
more reliable transport services; better communications services; improvements in
public health; and improvements in public amenity. However we must turn to the
empirical literature to answer the question of whether public infrastructure provides a
net benefit, in the form of an acceptable rate of return on additions to the stock of
public capital.  The available evidence suggests that the returns from public
infrastructure might be quite substantial.  For example, the World Bank (1994)
surveyed empirical studies, undertaken in the late 1980s and early 90s, of the link
between public capital and economic growth. They found that the range of the rates of
return on public infrastructure implied by the elasticities in these studies was 5 to 96
per cent. The average rate of return across these studies was 48 per cent, and the
median was 57 per cent. Otto and Voss (1994), investigating the link between public
capital and private production in Australia, find an output elasticity for public capital
for Australia of about 0.4, a figure they conclude is very similar to that found for the
United States by Aschauer (1989). The rate of return on public capital implied by
Aschauer’s elasticity of 0.4 was 60 per cent (World Bank, 1994). Assuming a roughly
similar ratio between the stock of public capital and GDP in Australia as in the US, a
similarly high rate of return for the Australian case would be implied by the findings
of Otto and Voss. As we discuss in Section 3.6, it is not the purpose of this paper to
present new evidence on the link between public capital and economic growth.
Nevertheless, we require a plausible assumption about this link in order to illustrate
the impact of alternative infrastructure financing arrangements.  In Section 3.6 we
choose a relatively conservative (compared to the estimates summarised in World
Bank 1994) rate of return assumption.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we provide an
overview of the MMRF model.  Section 3 discusses the simulation results. We divide
the simulations into three components: a component relating to the financing impacts
only (Sections 3.2 to 3.4); one relating to the construction phase only (Section 3.5);
and one relating to the flow of infrastructure benefits only (Section 3.6). We then
combine these components in Section 3.7. This allows us to compare paths for
selected regional macroeconomic variables under four alternative arrangements for
the financing of a program of infrastructure spending. Section 3.8 concludes the
paper.5
2. THE MODEL
The simulations presented in Section 3 of this paper were undertaken with the
Monash Multi-Regional Forecasting (MMRF) model of the Australian economy.
MMRF is large and detailed, making it impractical to provide a full description of its
theoretical structure and database in a paper of this size.  However the discussion of
results in Section 3 relies on familiar economic mechanisms, so that the reader need
not know every detail of MMRF to understand the simulation results.  The remainder
of this section provides an overview of MMRF.  The reader is referred to Naqvi and
Peter (1996) and Peter et al. (1996) for a detailed discussion of the model.
MMRF is a large-scale dynamic multi-regional computable general equilibrium
model of the Australian economy.  The model explicitly models the behaviour of
economic agents within each of Australia’s 8 states and territories.  The model
features detailed sectoral disaggregation, with the version employed in this paper
featuring 38 industries and commodities.  Familiar neoclassical assumptions govern
the behaviour of the model’s economic agents. Decision-making by firms and
households within each region is governed by maximising behaviour.  Each of the 38
representative industries operating within each of the 8 regions is assumed to
minimise costs subject to constant returns to scale production technologies and given
input prices. A representative utility-maximising household  resides in each of the
model’s 8 regions. Investors allocate new capital to industries on the basis of expected
rates of return. Units of new capital are assumed to be a cost-minimising combination
of inputs sourced from each of the model’s 9 sources of supply (the 8 domestic
regions plus imports).  Imperfect substitutability between the imported and 8 domestic
sources of supply for each commodity are modelled using the CES assumption of
Armington. In general, markets are assumed to clear and to be competitive.
Purchaser’s prices differ from basic prices by the value of a variety of indirect taxes
and margin services. Taxes and margins tend to differ across commodity, user, region
of source and region of destination. Foreign demands for each of the 38 commodities
from each of the 8 regions are modelled as being inversely related to their foreign
currency prices.   The details of the taxing, spending and transfer powers of two levels
of government are modelled: a regional government within each of the model’s 8
regions, and a federal government operating Australia wide. Inter-governmental
transfer payments and personal transfer payments to households are also modelled.
Dynamic equations describe stock-flow relationships, such as those between regional
industry capital stocks and regional industry investment levels. Dynamic adjustment
equations allow for the gradual movement of a number of variables towards their
long-run values. For example, the national real wage is assumed to be sticky in the
short-run, adjusting over a period of about five years to return the level of
employment to its base-case level following some economic shock. Regional
economic linkages arise from inter-regional trade, factor mobility, the taxing and
spending activities of the federal government, and long-run economy-wide
employment and balance of trade constraints. The model also evaluates a full set of
national and regional income accounts, and associated deflators.  The model is solved
with the GEMPACK economic modelling software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996).6
3. THE SIMULATIONS
3.1 Introduction
In each simulation the NSW government increases its annual spending on urban
infrastructure by $1 b.  We view this as consisting largely of extra spending on what
Aschauer (1989a) calls “core infrastructure” – roads, highways, public transport
systems, airports, and utilities. Consistent with the findings of Aschauer (1989a) we
assume that this spending will generate ongoing benefits to the residents of NSW. We
implement this via an improvement in regional total factor productivity.  The program
of additional infrastructure investment must be funded by the NSW government. We
evaluate the regional effects of the infrastructure program under three “up-front”
financing methods (developer charges, payroll tax, and residential rates) and one
deferred financing method (debt).
In analysing the four alternative scenarios, it will prove helpful to divide the economic
effects of each into three components:
(a) the impact of the additional construction activity generated by the $1 b. increase in
the NSW government’s annual infrastructure investment budget. We assume that
the details of the expenditure program are independent of the financing
instrument. Hence the economic effects of the additional construction activity will
be largely the same irrespective of which funding instrument is chosen.
(b) the impact of the improvement in regional productivity that is assumed to arise
from the new infrastructure.  Again, since these impacts will be determined by the
details of the expenditure program, they will be largely the same across the
alternative funding instruments.
(c) the impact of the funding instrument chosen to raise the required $1 billion.
These impacts will differ across each of the alternative funding mechanisms.
Since the economic effects of both the investment expenditure and the productivity
improvement (a and b above) should not differ materially across the alternative
financing instruments, we begin our explanation in Sections 3.2 through to 3.5 by
considering the funding impacts in isolation. In Section 3.6 we consider the
expenditure impacts in isolation.  Then in Section 3.7 we consider the productivity
impacts in isolation. Finally, in Section 3.8 we combine the financing, expenditure
and productivity impacts.  In each of these sections we use a simple stylised model
(hereafter the BOTE, or “back of the envelope” model) to illustrate the main
economic mechanisms in MMRF that account for the results reported in Tables 1
through to 10 and Charts 1 through to 4.  The results in these tables and charts are
reported as percentage deviations away from their “basecase” values. Prior to
undertaking the three sets of simulations (a) – (c) outlined above we first undertake a
simulation with MMRF in which we create a no-policy-change “basecase”. This
basecase is a forecast for the economies of Australia and its eight states and territories
excluding the effects of shocks (a) – (c) above.
3.2 Funding instrument 1: developer charges
Under this financing arrangement, the NSW government is assumed to raise the
required $1 b. in each year through an impost on residential property developers.
Essentially, we assume that the costs to the NSW government of extending trunk
infrastructure services and providing new local roads and utilities are passed on to the7
developers of new residential developments.  We use MMRF to evaluate the impact
of such a tax over the period 2004 to 2017. The results are reported in Table 1.  We
use a simple BOTE (“back of the envelope” model) to explain the main mechanisms
in MMRF that account for the results in Table 1. The BOTE model is comprised of
the following:
2 regions: NSW and the rest of Australia. Unless explicitly indicated otherwise,
the variables and equations of our BOTE model relate to the regional economy of
NSW. To avoid notational clutter, we suppress the regional (NSW) index on all
regional variables.  Hence all variables and coefficients in the BOTE model are to
be read as relating to the NSW economy, unless explicitly indicated otherwise by
the superscript “NAT”, which denotes a national variable.
3 commodities: c1, representing dwellings services; c2, representing a
domestically produced traded good; and c3, representing a competing import.
2 domestic industries: i1, using sector-specific capital (dwellings,  1 K ) to produce
c1; and i2 using labour ( 2 L ), sector-specific capital ( 2 K ), and commodities c2
and c3, as inputs to a Cobb-Douglas production function, to produce units of c2.
A household, which maximises (subject to a given budget and given commodity
prices) a Cobb-Douglas utility function by purchasing commodities c1, c2, and
c3.
An investor, which combines c2 and c3 according to a Cobb-Douglas production
technology to produce units of sector-specific capital for industries i1 and i2. The
investor’s desire to install units of capital is positively related to sector-specific
rates of return on capital.
Two primary factors: labour and capital.
To facilitate the use of the BOTE model to explain the MMRF results we have added
equations to MMRF which aggregate key results for the model’s 38 industries into
results for two broad sectors: dwellings services and non-dwellings. These two sectors
correspond to industries i1 and i2 of the BOTE model. The MMRF results for
variables describing key economic outcomes for these two sectors are included in
Tables 1 – 10.
We model developer charges as an impost on the cost of constructing dwellings.
Developer charges do not (directly) affect NSW wages in the short-run. They do
however increase the cost of constructing dwellings. This reduces rates of return on
new dwellings. In our simplified BOTE representation of investor behaviour in
MMRF, investors calculate the post-tax rate of return in industry i ( i  ) as the post-tax
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In the BOTE model, we assume that units of new capital for sector i are constructed
from imported and domestic goods via sector-specific Cobb-Douglas production
















i P   cost of acquiring a unit of capital for installation in industry i.
2 P basic price of the domestic commodity, c2.
K
i) (2,  share of the tax-exclusive cost of constructing capital for industry i represented
by the cost of purchases of the domestic commodity, c2.
3 P basic price of the imported commodity, c3.
K
i) (3,  share of the tax-exclusive cost of constructing capital for industry i represented
by the cost of purchases of the imported commodity, c3.
K
i T power of the tax (ie. 1 plus the rate of tax) levied on purchases of units of
capital for installation in industry i.
Since the purpose of the BOTE model is to be illustrative of the economic
mechanisms operating in MMRF, we use MMRF data to parameterise the BOTE
model. In MMRF, the 2004 value for investment in dwellings in NSW in the basecase
simulation is $15.6 b. In the BOTE model the initial value for 
K
1 T  is 1. Hence to raise
$1 b. annually to finance additional infrastructure spending via a developer charge,
the value of 
K
1 T  in the BOTE model must rise from 1.0 to 1.064. Via (E2) this has the
(direct) effect of increasing the cost of a new dwelling (
K
1 P ) by 6.4 per cent.  Turning
to (E1), we first note that in the short-run  1 Q  is determined outside of the system of
equations (E1) – (E2) by our assumption that the dwellings market clears.  In MMRF,
the output of the dwellings sector is sold entirely to consumers. In the BOTE model,
we represent the demand for dwelling services by households via the following
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where
D
1 X is household demand for housing services;
D
1 F allows for autonomous movements in household demand for dwellings;
1 P is the price of housing services; and
1
D  is the elasticity of demand for housing services.
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where 
S
1 X  is the supply of dwellings and  1 K  is the stock of the dwellings sector’s
capital (ie houses).
Sector-specific capital stocks ( i K ) are assumed to be exogenous in the short run. This
fixes 
S
1 X  in the short run, so (E3) determines  1 P  (and via E8,  1 Q ).  Hence  (E1)
determines  1   in the short-run. In the BOTE model,  1   falls by 6.4 per cent.
However MMRF projects a somewhat larger (8 per cent) fall in rates of return in the
dwellings sector. The MMRF result is greater than that anticipated by the stylised
model for two reasons.  First, unlike MMRF, the stylised model does not capture the
indirect effect of the developer charge on household consumption spending. In
MMRF the developer charge operates indirectly to reduce household consumption
expenditure (we discuss this effect further below). In (E3) this is equivalent to a fall in
the value of 
D
1 F . This causes the market-clearing value of  1 Q  to fall, reducing  1  .
Second, (E1) is a simplified representation of the actual equation determining
expected rates of return in MMRF. In particular, it excludes income taxes on gross
dwelling rents and the effects of depreciation on expected rates of return. These
simplifications cause (E1) to underestimate somewhat the effect of an increase in the
cost of capital on expected rates of return.
In MMRF, the level of investment in any given industry is positively related to that
industry’s expected rate of return on capital.  In the BOTE model, we represent this
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where
i I is capital formation in industry i;
Inv
i F allows for autonomous shifts in the relationship between rates of return and
capital formation; and
1
Inv  is the elasticity of capital supply to sector i.
In MMRF, 
1
Inv   has a value of approximately 1.25.  Hence the 8 per cent fall in
expected rates of return in year 1 translates to an approximately 10 per cent fall in
housing construction in NSW in year 1 (row 16).
Equations (E5) and (E6) describe the first order conditions relating to capital and
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1 Corresponding equations do not exist for the dwellings sector. This sector’s only input is capital. The
sector’s capital stock (and hence output) is exogenous in the short run. Long run capital supply to the
sector is determined by (E1), (E3) and (E8) under the assumption that the rate of return on the sector’s
capital stock is exogenous.10
where
W is the nominal take-home wage;
NAT
W T is the power (one plus the rate) of the federal income tax on labour income;
W T is the power (one plus the rate) of the state payroll tax;
(2)
L MP is the marginal product of labour in i2;
(2)
K MP is the marginal product of capital in sector i; and
Q
2 T is the power of the income tax on net (after tax) capital income in i2.
It is convenient at this point to also define the CPI and the purchaser’s price of c1:
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where:
C P is the consumer price index;
C
k  is the share of spending on good k in total household consumption; and
Q
1 T is the power of the income tax on net (after tax) capital income in i1.
In MMRF, real consumer wages at the regional level (that is, the nominal before
federal tax regional consumer wage, W
NAT
W T , deflated by the regional consumer
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where
NAT W is the nominal national wage; and
NAT
C P is the national consumer price index.
In the short run, national consumer real wages are assumed to be sticky, with national
employment endogenous.  In the long-run, national employment is exogenous, with
equality of national labour demand and national labour supply achieved via
movements in the national real consumer wage. Labour is assumed to be mobile
between regions in the long run. An important outcome of this treatment of the
regional labour market is that, even for a relatively large region such as NSW
2, as a
first approximation the regional real consumer wage can be viewed as exogenous to
the regional economy. This is not true of the regional real producer wage, since the
magnitude and direction of movements in the regional CPI and the prices of c1 and c2
can be quite different.
In the BOTE model, (E10) imposes a market clearing condition on net output of c2:
                                                          
2 Employment in NSW represents about one third of Australian employment.11
(E10) 
SC I G X
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Equation (E10) of the stylised model recognises that net output of c2 (
S
2 X ) is a
function of inputs of capital ( 2 K ) and labour ( 2 L ). Four final users of c2 are
recognised: NSW consumers (
C
2 X ), NSW investors (
I
2 X ), the NSW government
(
G
2 X ), and users outside of NSW (
X
2 X ). Equation (E10) also summarises the ideas that
investment demand for c2 is a positive function of aggregate investment in the region
(I), and that international and interregional export demands for c2 (
X
2 X ) are a negative
function of the regional terms of trade.
As already discussed, in MMRF the short-run effect of the developer charge is to
reduce rates of return on capital in the dwellings sector by about 8 per cent.  This
causes housing construction in NSW to fall by 9.6 per cent (row 16). Investment in
new dwellings represents approximately 25 per cent of total NSW investment.  Hence
the contraction in dwellings investment alone has a direct effect on NSW investment
of –2.45 per cent (–9.8 x 0.25).  Hence the negative deviation in dwellings investment
accounts for the bulk of the deviation in NSW investment (row 2). In (E10), the fall in
NSW investment causes 
I
2 X  to fall.  Assuming for the moment that 
S
2 X  and 
C
2 X  do
not change (we relax this assumption below), a fall in 
I
2 X  will be matched by a rise in
X
2 X . This is reflected in the MMRF results for NSW export volumes. In Table 1 we
find positive deviations in the 2004 values of NSW interregional exports (0.38 per
cent, row 5) and international exports (1.23 per cent, row 6). In MMRF, both
international and interregional export volumes are inversely related to export prices
3.
Hence a rise in 
X
2 X  must be associated with a fall in  2 P  relative to  3 P .  In MMRF this
is reflected in a negative deviation in the basic price of NSW non-dwelling output of
0.20 per cent in year 1 (row 17) and a positive deviation in the price of the RoA non-
dwelling output of 0.15 per cent (row 26).
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Given that the national real consumer wage is both sticky and determined by
conditions in the national labour market, the LHS of (E11) can be viewed as largely
exogenous to the NSW regional economy. On the RHS of (E11), the prices of both c1
and c3 are not directly affected by the imposition of the developer charge.  Hence
with  2 P  falling, the marginal product of labour in the non-dwellings sector must rise.
With  2 K  fixed in the short-run, a rise in 
(2)
L MP  requires that  2 L  fall.  Hence in 2004
we find employment in the non-dwellings sector in MMRF falling by 0.24 per cent
relative to basecase (row 18).  Since labour is not employed in the dwellings sector,
                                                          
3 In MMRF, international export volumes are significantly more price elastic than interregional export
volumes. This explains why the deviation in international export volumes is greater than the deviation
in interregional export volumes.12
total NSW employment also falls by 0.24 per cent (row 11). With employment in the
non-dwellings sector falling by 0.24 per cent, and the share of wages in the sector’s
total factor cost being approximately 0.73, output in the sector (
S
2 X ) falls by 0.17 per
cent (row 20).  Payments to primary factors in the non-dwellings sector represent
approximately 88 per cent of NSW GSP (gross state product) at factor cost.  Hence
the fall in activity in the NSW non-dwellings sector causes real NSW GSP to fall by
0.15 per cent (-0.15 = -0.17 x 0.88). Real NSW GSP at market prices (row 9) falls
faster than real NSW GSP at factor cost because of the sharp contraction in NSW
investment (row 2) which is subject to relatively high rates of indirect taxation.
Real consumption spending (row 1) falls by 0.17 per cent.  This reflects the fall in
employment (and hence labour income) and falling rental prices of capital in the
region (with employment and the terms of trade lower, so too are capital rental rates).
The fall in consumption spending causes household demand for dwelling services to
fall.  As discussed earlier, in the BOTE model this causes  1 Q  to fall and is one reason
why our earlier BOTE explanation underestimated the MMRF calculation of the
impact of the developer charge on rates of return in the dwellings sector.
The long run effects of the developer charge
In MMRF, changes in capital accumulation in each sector eventually return rates of
return on capital to exogenously specified long run rates of return.  We can express
this feature of MMRF in the BOTE model by assuming that  i   is exogenous.
Together, equations (E1) and (E2) now imply that a 6.4 per cent increase in 
K
1 T  will
increase  1 Q  by 6.4 per cent.  Via (E8) this will increase the consumer price of
dwelling services by 6.4 per cent.  Via (E7) this will have a direct effect on the CPI of
4 . 6
C
1 ⋅ α  per cent.  Assuming for the moment that the real national consumer wage is
not affected by the shock, equation (E9) implies that a  4 . 6
C
1 ⋅ α  per cent increase in
the NSW CPI will cause a  4 . 6
C
1 ⋅ α  per cent increase in the NSW nominal wage.  In
the non-dwellings sector, this causes the producer price of labour to rise relative to the
producer cost of capital. We find this reflected in the MMRF results for the year 2017,
where the nominal NSW wage is 0.36 per cent (row 15) above basecase while the
rental price of capital in the non-dwellings sector is 0.41 per cent (row 21) below
basecase.  This causes the capital/labour ratio in the sector to rise relative to basecase,
as producers substitute away from the now more relatively expensive labour input.
This accounts for the –0.33 per cent (-1.18 - -0.85 = -0.33 , rows 18 and 19) deviation
in the labour/capital ratio in the MMRF results.  A fall in the labour / capital ratio in
the non-dwellings sector implies that the marginal product of capital in the sector













    
All the variables on the RHS of (E6’) are exogenous in the long-run. Hence a fall in
the marginal product of capital must be associated with a rise in the regional terms of
trade (that is, the ratio P2 / P3 must rise). We find this reflected in the MMRF results
for 2017. The 2017 deviation in the price of NSW non-dwellings output is –0.05 per13
cent (row 17), while that for the rest of Australia is –0.53 per cent (row 26). This
represents a significant increase in the price of NSW output relative to goods sourced
from the rest of Australia or overseas. This causes price sensitive agents in NSW, the
rest of Australia, and overseas, to substitute away from goods produced in NSW.  In
terms of the BOTE model, this is represented by a fall in 
X
2 X .  Assuming for the
moment that real domestic absorption (
C
2 X  + 
I
2 X ) is unaffected, output of the non-
dwellings sector (
S
2 X ) must fall.  This accounts for MMRF’s projection of a –1.10 per
cent (row 20) deviation in the output of the NSW non-dwellings sector in 2017.  The
negative deviation in the sector’s output requires its usage of labour and capital to fall
relative to basecase (rows 18 and 19).  This accounts for the negative deviation in
long-run NSW real GDP (row 10).  With NSW employment and capital (rows 11 and
12) below their basecase values, so too is household income, and with it, real
consumption spending (row 1). Investment in NSW is also below basecase (row 2),
reflecting the contraction in the capital stocks of both the dwellings and non-dwellings
sectors of the NSW economy (row 12).
3.3 Funding instrument 2: Payroll taxes
In this simulation the NSW government finances the additional spending on
infrastructure by raising its annual collection of payroll tax by $1 b. Across each of
Australia’s state government jurisdictions, payroll tax is the instrument that accounts
for the highest proportion of state own-source revenue. As such, the payroll tax
instrument represents a feasible alternative to the developer charge for raising the
revenue required for the additional infrastructure spending. The NSW payroll tax
appears in (E5) of the BOTE model as  W T . The average rate of payroll tax in NSW is
initially approximately 2.7 per cent, hence the initial value for  W T  is 1.027. The initial
value of payroll tax receipts by the NSW government is approximately $4 b. Hence
the requirement to raise an additional $1 b. in revenue via the payroll tax instrument
requires that  W T  increase by 0.7 per cent, from 1.027 to 1.034. In both the BOTE
model and MMRF, payroll taxes are only levied on the non-dwellings sector (since no
labour is employed by the dwellings sector). Returning to (E11) we can see that the
short-run direct effect of the imposition of the payroll tax is an increase in the
(2)
L MP.
With capital stocks fixed in the short-run, this requires employment in the non-
dwellings sector to fall. In Table 2 we see MMRF projecting a deviation of –0.45 per
cent in non-dwellings sector employment (row 19) in 2004.  With capital stocks
initially fixed, this reduction in employment requires output of the non-dwellings
sector to fall. As already mentioned in Section 3.2, wages represent approximately
0.73 per cent of the sector’s total primary factor payments. Hence the –0.45 per cent
deviation in the sector’s employment causes its output to contract by 0.33 (0.73 x
0.45) per cent relative to basecase (row 21).  This causes real NSW GDP at factor cost
to fall by 0.29 per cent relative to basecase (row 10), since activity in the non-
dwellings sector represents approximately 88 per cent of NSW GDP at factor cost.
The contraction in real NSW GDP at market prices (row 9) is slightly greater than this
(at –0.33 per cent) because of the sharp contraction in NSW investment (row 2) which
is subject to relatively high rates of indirect taxation.
With employment in the non-dwellings sector lower, the marginal product of the
sector’s capital must also fall. From (E6) we can see that, ceterus paribus, a fall in14
(2)
K MP  must cause  2 Q  to fall, and that - via (E1) - this will cause  2   to also fall.
Since investment is positively related to rates of return (equation E4), the fall in  2 
causes investment in the sector to fall.  Investment in the dwellings sector also falls.
This is because, with real household consumption spending lower (see below),
demand by households for dwellings services declines. Via (E3) this causes the
market clearing rental price of dwellings (row 22) to fall relative to basecase, inducing
a negative deviation in dwellings investment (row 17). With both dwelling and non-
dwelling investment below their basecase values, total NSW investment is 1.37 per
cent below basecase (row 2).
The negative deviations in NSW employment and capital rental prices in the first year
of the simulation cause real NSW household disposable income to fall relative to
basecase. This accounts for the negative deviation in real household consumption
spending in year one (row 1).  Relative to their basecase values, real consumption
spending by both state and federal governments is assumed to be unaffected by the
financing shocks (rows 3 and 4).  Nevertheless, the reductions in household
consumption and private investment are sufficient to cause real NSW absorption to
fall by more than the reduction in real NSW GDP at market prices. In the BOTE
model, this situation can be represented in (E10) by the case where
SCI
222 XXX ( I) ∆> ∆+ ∆ .  Hence the region’s international and interregional trade
balances move towards surplus (rows 5 – 8).
Long-run results using the BOTE model
In the long-run, both the NSW real wage, and rates of return on NSW capital, are
largely determined outside of the NSW economy. While part of the impact of the
payroll tax in the short-run is absorbed by lower rates of return on NSW capital, this
is not possible in the long-run.  Rather, in the long-run, we expect most of the cost-
consequences of the payroll tax to be passed through to higher output prices.  Hence
the contractionary effects of the payroll tax on the NSW economy will be more severe
in the long-run.  In terms of the BOTE model, we return again to (E11) and (E6’):
(E11) 
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Our long run assumptions relating to the inter-regional mobility of both labour and
capital mean that the LHS’s of (E11) and (E6’) are largely exogenous to the NSW
economy in the long-run.  Under this closure, an increase in  W T  by 0.7 per cent tends
to increase the producer price of labour relative to the producer price of capital by
about 0.7 per cent.  However at the national level the real consumer wage is required
to fall by 0.29 per cent to clear the national labour market (row 23). Via (E9) this
reduces the price of labour in NSW by about 0.3 per cent.  With the payroll tax adding
about 0.7 per cent to the per unit cost of labour in NSW, and the fall in the national
real wage subtracting about 0.3 per cent from the per unit price of labour in NSW, the
producer price of a unit of labour rises by about 0.4 per cent in NSW in the long run
(row 16).  In the BOTE model the production function has been specified as Cobb-15
Douglas, giving a substitution elasticity between capital and labour of 1.  However in
MMRF, substitution between capital and labour is governed by industry-specific CES
functions.  On average these functions specify a substitution elasticity of about 0.5.
Hence, with the producer price of labour rising by about 0.4 per cent and the producer
price of capital largely unaffected by the shock (row 22), we would anticipate an
increase in the capital / labour ratio of about 0.2 per cent (0.4 x 0.5). This is reflected
in the MMRF results, where we find the capital / labour ratio rising by 0.21 per cent (-
0.76 - - 0.97, rows 19 and 20). While this substitution effect allows us to anticipate the
direction of change in the capital / labour ratio, it does not allow us to anticipate the
change in inputs of capital and labour. To explain the sharp drop in employment and
capital in NSW we must turn to (E6’) and (E10). We know from the short-run results
that capital accumulation in the non-dwellings sector initially falls as a results of the
fall in capital rental prices.  Hence we might expect the sector’s capital stock to be
lower in the long-run than in the short-run.  Both the BOTE model and the MMRF
results confirm this expectation.  The rise in sector 2’s long-run capital / labour ratio
means that the marginal product of capital in sector 2 must fall.  With all the LHS
variables in (E6’) exogenous, a fall in sector 2’s marginal product of capital requires
that the ratio  2 P / 3 P  must rise.  This is reflected in the MMRF results, where we find
the price of NSW sector 2’s output is 0.23 per cent above basecase by 2017 (row 18)
while that for the competing product from the rest of Australia is 0.12 per cent below
basecase by 2017 (row 27). In the BOTE model, this causes a contraction in 
X
2 X  in
(E10). This is expressed in MMRF as sharp contractions in interregional and
international export volumes (-0.41 and –1.10 per cent respectively) as price-sensitive
agents in the rest of Australia substitute away from NSW goods and price-sensitive
agents overseas reduce their imports of NSW goods.  In the BOTE model, a long-run
reduction in 
X
2 X  translates into a long-run reduction in 
S
2 X . This is expressed in
MMRF as a 0.93 per cent reduction in the output of the non-dwellings sector (row
21).  However the contraction in this sector’s output is not solely attributable to the
contraction in 
X
2 X .  As the sector’s output contracts, so too does its employment of
labour and capital (rows 19 and 20).  This causes household factor income to fall, and
with it household real consumption spending. In the BOTE model this is reflected in a
contraction in 
C
2 X , and in MMRF as a -1.1 per cent deviation in NSW real private
consumption spending (row 1).  With the capital stock smaller in the long-run, less
investment is required in each year to maintain the smaller capital stock.  Hence long-
run investment spending in NSW is also projected to fall relative to basecase by 2017
(row 2). From (E10) of the BOTE model, we can see that (through a fall in 
I
2 X ) this
represents a further source of contraction in factor usage in sector 2 and hence the
wider NSW economy.
Comparison of long-run results of developer charge and payroll taxes
Recall from Section 3.2 that our long-run assumption of exogenous rates of return on
capital implies that the developer charge must eventually be passed on to the users of
dwellings services in the form of a higher price for dwelling services. Graph 1 charts
the MMRF results describing the transmission of the developer charge through to the
price paid by households for dwelling services. The immediate impact of the
developer charge in MMRF is to increase the cost of new housing by 5.8 per cent.
This is somewhat less than the direct effect of the developer charge (+6.4 per cent)16
because the prices of inputs into dwelling construction fall as a result of the tax-
induced contraction in dwelling construction activity (in terms of the BOTE model, as
K
2 T  rises by 6.4 per cent, 
KK
(2,1) (3,1) ￿￿
23 P P  falls by 0.6 per cent).
The fall in dwelling construction activity causes investment in the sector to decline
below that necessary to maintain the stock of dwellings.  Hence, over time, the
gradual process of depreciation leads to a decline in the stock of dwellings.  This
causes the rental price of dwelling services to rise over time.  By 2017, this process
has caused the rental price of capital in the dwelling services sector to increase by 5.2
per cent relative to basecase.  Unlike the BOTE model, in MMRF inputs into the
provision of dwelling services include not only the capital services of the dwellings
themselves, but also material and service inputs such as finance and property services
and maintenance expenditures.  Overall, the value of these material and service inputs
are projected to comprise about 30 per cent of the purchaser’s price of dwelling
services by 2017. Hence the impact of the increase in the rental price of capital (+5.2
per cent) on the purchaser’s price of dwelling services in 2017 is approximately 3.6
per cent (0.70 x 5.2). In terms of the BOTE model, this corresponds to an increase in
1 P  in 2017 of  3.6 per cent. From (E5’) it is clear that the impact of this price increase
will depend on the value of 
C
1 α  - the share of the cost of dwelling services in total
consumption by NSW households. By 2017 this share is about 0.25 in MMRF. Hence
C
1 ￿
1 P  increases by 0.9 per cent. This is about 0.2 percentage points higher than the
increase in  W T  under payroll tax financing. This largely accounts for the more severe
regional macroeconomic impact of the developer charge in 2017 relative to payroll
financing.
3.3 Funding instrument 3: debt
In this simulation the NSW government borrows an additional $1 b. each year to
finance the additional spending on infrastructure. The NSW government is assumed to
repay each tranche of debt over a period of twenty years.  At an interest rate of 5.5 per
cent
4, this requires annual payments of $84 m. Under this option, the NSW
government gradually raises payroll taxes to pay the ever-increasing interest and
principal bill: $83.7 m. in 2004, $167.4 m. in 2005, $251.1 m. in 2006, and so on.
The NSW payroll tax appears in (E5) of the BOTE model as  W T . The average rate of
payroll tax in NSW is initially approximately 2.7 per cent, hence the initial value for
W T  is 1.027. The initial value of payroll tax receipts by the NSW government is
approximately $4 b. Hence the requirement in year 1 to raise an additional $84 m. in
revenue via the payroll tax instrument requires that  W T  increase by 0.06 per cent,
from 1.027 to 1.0276. Returning to (E5’) we can see that the short-run direct effect of
the imposition of the payroll tax is an increase in the
(2)
L MP . With capital stocks fixed
in the short-run, this requires employment in NSW to fall. From Table 3 we see that
MMRF projects a fall in NSW employment in year 1 of 0.04 per cent (row 11). The
                                                          
4 Approximately the 10 year NSW government bond rate at the time of writing. We assume that this
rate is not affected over the period of the simulation by the increase in NSW net liabilities arising from
our debt funding assumption.17
remaining long run and short run mechanisms via which the debt instrument affect the
economy are the same as that for the payroll tax instrument, so no further discussion
of these mechanisms is necessary.
Debt compared with developer charges and payroll tax financing
A comparison of the results in Tables 1 - 3 show that the short-run effects on the
regional macroeconomy of the debt instrument are substantially less disruptive than
those of either the developer charge or payroll tax financing. In the short-run, this is
largely due to the significantly smaller tax burden imposed on the NSW economy
under debt financing. In year 1 of the debt financing simulation, an additional $86 m.
in payroll taxes are levied. Under either the developer charge or payroll tax options,
the additional taxation burden imposed on the NSW economy is over ten times larger,
at $ 1 b.  However by 2017, the total tax burden under the debt financing option has
become larger than under either of the up-front financing options ($84m x 14 years =
$1176 m.).  Nevertheless, the impact of debt financing on the macroeconomy is still
less severe than under either the developer charge or the payroll tax option.  Recall
from the discussion of the payroll tax option in Section 3.3 that the macroeconomic
consequences of the payroll tax become progressively more severe as rates of return
on NSW capital have time to return to their basecase levels.  Under the payroll tax
financing option, much of this adjustment has taken place by 2017.  However, under
debt financing, the payroll tax burden is increased incrementally, by approximately
$84 m. per annum.  Hence the 2017 impacts for the debt instrument represent the
combined effects of both the short-run impacts of the most recent additions to the
payroll tax burden and the long-run impacts of the earliest additions to the payroll tax
burden. Since the long-run impact on employment of an increase in payroll tax is
substantially larger than the short run impact (see Section 3.3) the impact on
employment of the debt instrument is lower than that of the payroll tax instrument in
2017, even though the total payroll revenue being raised under the debt instrument in
2017 ($1176 m.) is about 17 per cent higher than that being raised under the payroll
instrument in 2017 ($1000 m.). Clearly, once the long-run effects of the annual
payroll tax increases under the debt instrument have had time to work through the
economy, the employment impact of the debt instrument will be greater than that of
the payroll tax instrument.  This eventuality is hinted at by the greater slope (relative
to payroll financing) on the employment curve for debt financing towards the end of
the simulation period (Chart 2).  Eventually, the annual payroll tax burden under debt
must stabilise at $1680 m. Hence in the long run we would expect the impact of the
debt instrument on the economy to be about 70 per cent greater than that of the
payroll instrument.  This eventuality has not had time to unfold in the 13 years of
results reported in this paper.
3.4 Funding instrument 4: residential rates
In this simulation the NSW government raises its annual collection of residential rates
by $1 b. to finance the additional spending on infrastructure. Residential rates are
levied on residential properties on the basis of their estimated market value.  Since,
for a given discount rate, market value will tend to be closely related to a property’s
rental price, we model residential rates in MMRF as an income tax levied on capital
income in the dwelling services sector.  Capital income taxes appear in (E8) of the
BOTE model as 
1
Q T  . In MMRF, the average income tax rate on capital income in the
NSW dwellings sector in 2004 is about 0.2. In the BOTE model, this is represented by18
1
Q T  having an initial value of 1.25.  In MMRF, this tax initially raises approximately
$5.7 b. from the $28.6 b. of gross capital income in the NSW dwellings sector. Under
the residential rates financing option, total collections of capital income taxes from
this sector must rise by $1b., to $6.7 b. This requires the rate of the tax to increase
from 0.20 to 0.23. In the BOTE model, this is represented by a 3.5 per cent increase in
the value of 
1
Q T , from 1.25 to 1.29.
In the short-run, the purchaser’s price for dwelling services,  1 P , is determined by the
market clearing condition for residential property (E3).  Hence (E8) determines  1 Q ,
and a 3.5 per cent increase in 
Q
1 T  will be matched by a 3.5 per cent decrease in  1 Q .
In the BOTE model this generates a 3.5 per cent reduction in the post-tax rate of
return on residential capital via (E1).  Just as we found with the developer charge (and
for the same reasons), the BOTE model somewhat underestimates the impact of an
increase in residential rates on rates of return, with MMRF calculating a 4.8 per cent
reduction in rates of return in the dwellings sector.  The short-run transmission of an
increase in rates to the wider NSW economy is, from this point, identical to that of the
developer charge. The reduction in expected rates of return causes investment in the
dwellings sector to fall relative to basecase (row 16)  This causes the NSW balance of
trade to move towards surplus (rows 5 – 8).  However this requires the relative price
of traded goods to fall (rows 17, 26).  This fall in the NSW terms of trade causes
employment to fall (row 11) and with it real consumption (row 1).
The long-run transmission mechanism for rates is also the same as that for developer
charges.  Using the BOTE model, in the long run  1   is assumed to be exogenous.
Hence a 3.5 per cent increase in 
Q
1 T  will cause a 3.5 per cent increase in the long run
rental price of dwelling services,  1 P .Chart 3 plots the year-on-year deviation in the
rental price of capital in the dwelling services sector under the rates financing option.
By 2017 much of the movement towards the long run deviation in  1 P  is complete.
Unlike the BOTE model, MMRF distinguishes between the price paid by households
for dwelling services and the rental price of capital in the dwelling services sector.  As
discussed in Section 3.2, the cost of capital services accounts for about 70 per cent of
the purchaser’s price of dwelling services in NSW.  In this simulation, expected rates
of return in the dwellings sector are returned to their long-run level by the process of
depreciation gradually reducing the size of the dwellings capital stock.  By 2017 this
process has increased the rental price of capital in the sector by 3.1 per cent (Chart 3).
This translates into an increase in the price paid by households for dwelling services
of 0.7 x 3.1 = 2.1 per cent (Chart 3). As discussed in Section 3.2, real consumer wages
in NSW are effectively exogenous in the long run, since they are indexed to the
national consumer wage.  Hence, just as with the developer charge, an increase in
rates feeds into long-run NSW nominal wage demands via its impact on the NSW
consumer price index.  This increases real producer wages, reducing employment.
Since the mechanisms via which the two instruments act on the NSW economy are
the same, we might expect the two instruments to have the same macroeconomic
impacts. This is broadly the case.  By 2017 the developer charge has increased the
consumer price of dwellings by 3.6 per cent (Chart 1).  For rates, the same figure is
2.1 per cent (Chart 3).  The ratio of these impacts is approximately 1.7 per cent. By
driving up nominal wages, the direct effect of these price shocks is to reduce19
employment in the two simulations. Not surprisingly, the ratio of the employment
impacts (-1.2/-0.7 =1.7) in the two simulations is the same as the ratio of the
dwellings services price impacts under the two simulations (3.6 / 2.1).  The ratios of
the remaining macroeconomic impacts under the two financing instruments are
broadly similar.
Why rates are less disruptive to the regional macroeconomy than developer charges
An interesting question to consider is - since the amount being raised ($ 1 b.) under
both the developer charge and the increase in rates is identical, and since the
mechanisms via which both taxes operate on the NSW economy are the same - why
are rates found to be a superior financing option to the developer charge? The
macroeconomic impacts of the two options depend on the ratio of the dwellings
sector’s rate of growth in capital stock to its gross rate of return on capital.  This can
be seen by considering equations (E1), (E2) and (E8) of the BOTE model.  Together
these three equations imply:
(E12)
KK
(2,i) (3,i) ￿￿ QK
1 231 1 1 P PP  =
Converting (E12) to a percentage rate of change form, and assuming  2 P  and  3 P  are
unchanged, gives:
(E13)    11 1 1
QK pt t ρ −=+
where  1 p ,  1 ρ ,  1
Q t , and 
K
i t  are the percentage changes in the levels variables 1 P ,  1  ,
Q
1 T , and 
K
1 T . In the short-run  1 P  is given by the market clearing condition in the
dwellings services market ( 1 p = 0) so that positive shocks to  1
Q t  or  1
K t act to reduce
1 ρ . In the long-run  1   is exogenous ( 1 ρ = 0) so that positive shocks to  1
Q t  or  1
K t  act to
increase  1 p .  Clearly, if the shocks to  1
Q t  and  1
K t  are the same, then developer charges
and residential rates have identical effects.  In Sections 3.2 and 3.4 we calculated the
percentage changes in these t’s as ($1 b. / $tax_base) x 100.  In the developer charge
case, $tax_base is equal to the 2004 value of investment in the residential dwellings
sector.  This was $15.6 b., yielding a shock value for  1
K t  of (1 / 15.6) x 100 = 6.4 per
cent.  In the residential rates case, $tax_base is equal to the 2004 value of gross
returns to capital in the dwellings services sector.  This was $28.6 b., yielding a shock
value for  1
Q t  of (1 / 28.6) x 100 = 3.5 per cent.  Raising $1 b. from the two instruments
will only yield identical results in the case where the annual investment in the sector
is equal to the annual gross return on capital in the sector.  This is broadly the same as
the requirement that the gross growth rate in capital in the sector be the same as the
gross rate of return on capital in the sector.  For dwelling services, it is reasonable to
expect the former to typically be less than the latter: rates of return on capital in the
sector will need to be similar to that available on other assets, while slow-changing
demographic factors will be the main determinant of the sector’s net growth.20
3.5 Building the infrastructure
Table 5 reports MMRF projections for the economic effects of an unfunded $1 b.
increase in the NSW government’s annual infrastructure budget. We model this as a
$1 b. increase in spending by the NSW government on output of the NSW
Construction sector.  We again use the BOTE model developed in Section 3.2 to
explain the short-run and long-run MMRF results.
Short run effects of the increase in NSW government spending on urban infrastructure
In terms of the BOTE model, output of the NSW Construction sector is aggregated
with the output of other non-dwellings industries in c2. The extra spending by the
NSW government on urban infrastructure can thus be represented in the BOTE model
as an increase in 
G
2 X .  The initial level of NSW government consumption spending in
the MMRF basecase is $28.7 b.  The addition of $1 b. of spending on urban
infrastructure therefore lifts real NSW government spending by 3.48 per cent (row 3).
In the BOTE model, this is equivalent to a 3.48 per cent increase in 
G
2 X  in (E10). In
using (E10) to understand the effects of an increase in 
G
2 X , it is helpful to view 
S
2 X  as
initially given by i2’s pre-shock usage of capital and labour, and 
C
2 X  as initially given
by the pre-shock level of NSW household income. Then the direct effect of 
G
2 X  can
be seen to be a fall in 
X
2 X .  This result is reflected in the MMRF projections, where
we find NSW net exports contracting (rows 5-8).  However for NSW net exports to
contract, the price of goods produced in NSW must rise relative to competing goods
produced in the rest of Australia and overseas.  In the BOTE model, the ratio  23 P /P
must rise. The MMRF results accord with this result.  The MMRF variables that
correspond broadly to these BOTE prices are reported in rows 17 and 26 of Table 5.
MMRF projects a positive deviation in the basic price of the output of the NSW non-
dwellings sector ( 2 P  in the BOTE model) of 0.15 per cent (row 17) and a negative
deviation in the basic price of the output of the non-dwellings sector in the rest of
Australia (the non-foreign component of  3 P  in the BOTE model) of 0.13 per cent
(row 26).
The increase in the NSW regional terms of trade, which the rise in the  23 P /P  ratio
represents, causes NSW employment to rise. Turning to (E11) of the BOTE model,
with the real consumer wage exogenous the increase in the ratio  23 P /P  causes the
marginal product of labour to fall.  With capital stocks exogenous in the short run, the
fall in the marginal product of labour is secured by a rise in employment.  Hence in
MMRF we find employment in the non-dwellings sector increasing by 0.19 per cent
(row 18) relative to basecase. Since the non-dwelling sector is the sole employer of
labour, NSW employment also rises by 0.19 per cent (row 11) relative to basecase.
This causes a positive deviation in NSW real GDP (row 9).
The increase in employment causes rates of return on capital to rise, and with them,
levels of sectoral investment. In terms of the BOTE model, with employment higher
and capital stocks fixed, 
(2)
K MP  in (E6) must rise.  2 P  is also rising. With 
Q
2 T
exogenous,  2 Q  and with it  2   (via E1) must also rise. With real consumption
spending higher (see below)  1 Q  is higher (via E3 and E8) and hence so too is  1  . As21
a result investment in both the dwellings and non-dwellings sectors must rise (via E4).
In the MMRF results we see this expressed as a 0.21 per cent (row 16) deviation in
dwellings investment and a 0.16 per cent (row 2) deviation in total NSW investment.
With employment and capital rental rates higher, so too is household income. In
MMRF, regional household consumption spending is linked to regional household
incomes. This accounts for the 0.16 per cent increase in real NSW consumption
spending (row 1).
Long run effects of the increase in NSW government spending on urban infrastructure
In MMRF, the only factor of production that is assumed to be in long run fixed supply
to the NSW economy is agricultural land.  However returns to agricultural land
represent an insignificant (less than one per cent) proportion of NSW GDP at factor
cost.  Within the constraint of exogenous long run national labour supply, NSW is
assumed to be able to attract additional labour from the rest of Australia at the market
clearing national real wage. Capital is in elastic supply to NSW industries at
exogenous rates of return on regional industry capital. Hence long run factor supplies
to the non-agricultural industries of NSW are highly elastic. This allows the NSW
economy to accommodate a long run expansion in government spending through
increased employment of labour and capital with only small movements in relative
prices. In Table 5, this is reflected in increased usage of capital (row 12) as well as
labour by 2017. The employment / capital ratio is higher in NSW (compare rows 18
and 19) despite the fall in the rental / wage ratio (compare rows 21 and 15) because of
a change in the industrial composition of NSW economic activity.  Recall that the
3.48 per cent increase in real NSW state government consumption spending (row 3) is
comprised entirely of additional spending on output of the NSW Construction sector.
This causes a relatively large (2.33 per cent
5) positive deviation in the output of NSW
Construction in 2017. The NSW Construction sector is very labour intensive relative
to the NSW economy as a whole. Since the deviation in the output of this sector (2.33
per cent) is much greater than the deviation in NSW output (0.14 per cent, row 10) the
NSW labour / capital ratio increases relative to basecase.
The increase in labour and capital supply to the NSW economy causes household
factor incomes to be higher. This allows household consumption spending to be
higher than basecase (row 1). Real investment spending (row 2) is above its basecase
level because of the positive deviation in the NSW capital stock (row 12). The
increase in demand for labour by the NSW economy causes a small rise in the
national real wage (row 22). This causes the NSW real consumer wage (row 15 – row
14) to also rise. As a result, there is a small increase in the NSW real producer wage
(row 15 – row 13). This causes activity in sectors exposed to interregional and
international competition to contract. This accounts for the small negative deviations
in interregional (row 5) and international (row 6) export volumes. International and
interregional imports into NSW (rows 7 and 8) are slightly above basecase. This
largely reflects the effects of an increase in NSW economic activity on demand for
imports, although there is also a small relative price effect at work (compare rows 17
and 26).
                                                          
5 Not reported in Table 5.22
3.6 Benefits from the additional infrastructure
Consistent with literature on the productivity effects of public sector infrastructure
expenditure, we assume that each dollar of additional expenditure by the NSW
government produces a benefit in the form of a permanent increase in private sector
6
primary factor productivity. The literature suggests that the benefits from such
expenditure might be substantial. For example the average rate of return on public
infrastructure reported in World Bank (1994) is approximately 50 per cent. However
we recognise that the actual benefits that might arise from additional spending on
infrastructure in NSW must ultimately depend on the details of the infrastructure that
is to be built, and so can only be known after evaluations have been undertaken on a
project-by-project basis. Hence our assumptions relating to the benefits of additional
infrastructure spending are necessarily illustrative only. For the purpose of illustrating
with MMRF the economic effects of an infrastructure-induced improvement in
regional productivity, we adopt a far more conservative ratio of benefits to costs than
those found in the World Bank’s literature survey. We assume that each additional
dollar of infrastructure spending provides an annuity of 0.15 dollars. This is delivered
in the form of a permanent increase in NSW private sector productivity. We assume
that the stream of benefits commences one year after the infrastructure is built. With a
return of 0.15 cents, and a one year lag between spending and the commencement of
benefits, the benefit-cost ratio with a discount rate of 7 per cent is 2. This is
approximately the hurdle ratio employed by NSW public authorities.
To explain the short-run MMRF projections of the impact of the productivity
improvement on the NSW economy using the BOTE model, we must include a
variable describing primary factor productivity ( i A ) in equations (E3), (E5), (E6) and
(E10).  These equations now become:
(E12) 
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The initial value of  i A  is 1. The value of returns to primary factors in all sectors other
than the public sector in NSW is approximately $210 b. Since each additional $1 b. of
infrastructure is assumed to generate on-going benefits of $0.15 b. per annum, the
value of  i A  must fall by approximately 0.07 per cent in each year (-0.15/210). In
equation (E12) a fall in  2 A  causes 
(2)
L MP  to fall.  Since capital stocks are fixed in the
short run, this requires employment in the non-dwellings sector to rise. This accounts
for the 0.05 per cent deviation in NSW employment in 2005 (rows 18 and 11).
In (E14) both the increase in employment and the improvement in primary factor
productivity allow the output of the non-dwellings sector to expand.  Payments to
labour represent approximately 73 per cent of total factor payments in the NSW non-
                                                          
6 We assume that the Public Administration and Defence industries (which sell almost all their output
to government final demands) in NSW do not participate in the general improvement in NSW primary
factor productivity.23
dwellings sector. Hence the 0.05 per cent deviation in the sector’s employment
accounts for 0.04 percentage points (0.73 x 0.05) of the deviation in the sector’s
output (row 20). The deviation in the sector’s output is greater than 0.04 per cent
because of the 0.07 per cent improvement (relative to basecase) in the sector’s
primary factor productivity.  Recall however that in the MMRF simulation the
assumed improvement in primary factor productivity is isolated to private sector
industries. NSW public sector industries (Public Administration and Defence) account
for approximately a fifth of the value added in the NSW non-dwellings sector. Hence
primary factor technical change contributes 0.05 percentage points (0.8 x 0.07 = 0.05)
to the deviation in the output of the NSW non-dwellings sector (row 20). Value added
in this sector accounts for approximately 88 per cent of NSW GDP at factor cost.
Hence the deviation in this sector’s output accounts for 0.08 percentage points of the
0.09 per cent deviation in real NSW GDP (row 10). Returns to capital in the dwellings
sector account for the remaining 12 per cent of NSW GDP at factor cost. In the
MMRF simulation the dwellings sector is assumed to participate in the improvement
in productivity. Via (E15), output of this sector expands by 0.07 per cent. This
accounts for the remaining 0.01 percentage points (0.12 x 0.07 = 0.01) of the positive
deviation in NSW real GDP in 2005 (row 10).
Returning to (E14), and assuming for the moment that 
C
2 X  and 
I
2 X  are not





2 X  to increase. In MMRF, this is reflected in positive deviations in
interregional (row 5) and international (row 6) export volumes.  Import volumes also
rise relative to basecase (rows 7 and 8), largely because economic activity in NSW is
higher than basecase. The deviation towards balance of trade surplus requires the
price of NSW goods to fall relative to the prices of competing imports from the rest of
Australia and overseas.  This accounts for the negative deviation in the price of output
of the non-dwellings sector (row 17) and the NSW GDP deflator (row 13). Note that
in (E12) the decline in the regional terms of trade has a damping effect on the positive
effect on employment of the improvement in primary factor productivity.
The improvement in primary factor productivity and increase in employment causes
rates of return on capital, and hence investment, to increase. In (E13) the increase in
employment in the non-dwellings sector causes 
(2)
K MP  to rise. The impact of this on
2 Q  is offset somewhat by the fall in  2 P , but with  2 A  also lower,  2 Q  must rise.  Via
(E1) this causes rates of return on capital in the non-dwellings sector to increase. This
causes investment in the sector to also rise (via E4). Investment in the dwellings
sector is subject to two countervailing effects. The improvement in primary factor
productivity augments the effective supply of capital in the sector by 0.07 per cent. In
(E15) this causes  1 P  to fall. However household real consumption spending is rising
and demand for housing is relatively income elastic. This income effect could be
represented in (E15) through an rise in 
D
1 F . In MMRF the latter effect dominates,
leading to a positive deviation in dwellings investment (row 17). With investment in
both the non-dwellings and dwellings sectors rising relative to basecase, there is a
positive deviation in aggregate NSW real investment spending (row 2).24
In MMRF, movements in household consumption spending are linked to movements
in household disposable income. In this simulation, there is a positive deviation in
NSW household disposable income because of the positive deviations in NSW
employment (row 11), the real wage (row 15 – row 14), and returns to capital in the
NSW non-dwellings sector
7 (row 21). The positive deviation in NSW household
disposable income accounts for the positive deviation in NSW real consumption
spending (row 1).
3.7 The combined financing, construction, and benefit impacts
Tables 7 to 10 report results for simulations in which the construction, financing, and
productivity effects of the infrastructure program are fed into the model
simultaneously as exogenous shocks. While MMRF is a non-linear model, the results
in Tables 7 to 10 are nevertheless approximately equal to the sum of the results for the
construction effects alone (Table 5), the productivity effects alone (Table 6) and the
appropriate financing effects alone (one of Tables 1 to 4).  As such, the results in
Tables 7 to 10 are explicable in terms of the explanations provided in Sections 3.2 to
3.6 for the separate effects of the financing, construction and productivity shocks in
isolation. To bring these explanations together, without unduly duplicating the
explanations in Section 3.2 to 3.6, we concentrate in the remainder of this section on
explaining the paths for one key NSW macroeconomic variable - employment (Chart
4).  The results in Chart 4 imply a clear preference for debt and rates financing over
the payroll taxes and developer charges.
With payroll tax financing, the costs of employing labour in NSW rise immediately,
leading to a steep fall in employment.  NSW employment then stays below its
basecase forecast level until 2016. Beyond 2016 the extra productivity in NSW is
sufficient to compensate NSW employers for the payroll tax. This allows employment
in NSW to then move above its basecase forecast level beyond 2016.
With developer charges, the costs of extra infrastructure expenditure do not affect
NSW wages in the short run. However they lead to a reduction in housing
construction activity with a related short-run reduction in employment. The
employment trough under developer charges is shallower than under payroll
financing. However it is significantly longer. While developer charges do not directly
affect the cost of employing labour in the short run, in the long run they work their
way into the rental values of NSW properties, thereby affecting the NSW CPI and
NSW wages. This has a long run damping effect on NSW employment. Employment
in NSW does not begin returning to its basecase level until 2012, and still remains
below its basecase level by the end of the simulation period.
With debt financing, employment in NSW is immediately stimulated by increased
construction activity. Thereafter, the effects of the gradual increase in taxes to pay the
interest and principal bill on the borrowed funds are approximately offset by increased
productivity. Hence with debt financing, employment in NSW is above its basecase
forecast level throughout the simulation period.
                                                          
7 The NSW dwellings capital stock is assumed to be entirely owned by residents of NSW and output of
the NSW dwellings services industry is sold only to NSW residents. Hence movements in capital
rentals in this sector affect the aggregate income and the aggregate outlays of NSW households in
equal amounts.25
Under rates financing, rates of return on residential property immediately fall, but not
by as much as under developer charges. While housing investment contracts, the
impact on employment is offset by the infrastructure construction stimulus. This
allows NSW employment to rise above its basecase forecast level. Just as with
developer charges, rates eventually feed into NSW nominal wage demands. Hence the
positive employment deviation becomes smaller over 2005 to 2008, until the
productivity effects begin to compensate employers for workers’ increasing nominal
wage demands.26
4. CONCLUSIONS
In contrast to up-front financing methods (such as developer charges, payroll tax, and
residential rates), the paper finds that the gains from urban infrastructure are greatest
when the chosen financing method provides a closer match between the timing of the
burden of financing the infrastructure and the timing of the benefits provided by the
infrastructure. In this paper this was achieved by using the debt instrument, but it
might equally be achieved by other deferred financing methods such as public-private
partnerships (PPP’s) and user charges. Compared with financing by payroll tax or
developer charges (and to a lesser degree, rates), debt financing gives considerably
higher increases in employment, consumption, capital and GSP both in the short run
and in the long run.  The advantage of debt financing over the methods involving
immediate taxation is that the costs of the extra infrastructure affect wages in NSW
only with a very long lag. With debt financing, employment in NSW is immediately
stimulated by increased construction activity, with no offsetting increases in taxes.
The effects of the gradual increase in taxes to pay the interest and principal bill are
offset by increased productivity. Thus with debt financing, all measures of
macroeconomic activity in NSW are above their basecase forecast levels throughout
the simulation period. These results suggest that a greater reliance by regional
governments on debt financing of infrastructure programs might be warranted.
Similarly, the developer charge and payroll tax appear to be poor choices of financing
instrument. However we qualify these tentative conclusions by noting that there are at
three aspects of our modelling which require further work. Firstly, we intend
expanding the study period beyond 2017. This will allow a better comparison of the
debt and payroll tax instruments in the very long run. Secondly, such an extension of
the study period will allow us to compare net present values of relevant flows (such as
real consumption spending) over an appropriately long period. Thirdly, in future work
we intend expanding the range of financing options under investigation to include
other deferred financing techniques such as PPP’s and user charges. Our expectation
is that, just as we found with debt, these deferred financing techniques will be
superior to up-front financing options.27
REFERENCES
Aschauer, D.A. 1989. Is public expenditure productive? Journal of Monetary
Economics, Vol. 23, pp 177-200.
Harrison, W.J. and K.R. Pearson. 1996. Computing solutions for large general
equilibrium models using GEMPACK. Computational Economics,  Vol. 9: 83 –
127.
Naqvi, F. and M.W. Peter. 1996. A multi-regional multi-sectoral model of the
Australian economy with an illustrative application. Australian Economic
Papers, 35(66), 94 – 113.
Otto, G. and G.M. Voss. 1994. Public capital and private sector productivity. The
Economic Record. Vol. 70, No. 209, pp. 121 – 132.
Peter, M.W., Horridge, M., Meagher, G.A., Naqvi, F., and Parmenter, B.R. 1996. The
theoretical structure of the MONASH-MRF, Preliminary Working Paper No.
OP-85. Centre of Policy Studies, Monash University, Melbourne.
The World Bank. 1994. World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for
development. The World Bank, Oxford University Press, New York.28
TABLE 1: DEVELOPER CHARGE FINANCING IMPACTS (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 -0.17 -0.34 -0.49 -0.62 -0.73 -0.85 -0.95 -1.06 -1.15 -1.24 -1.32 -1.40 -1.47 -1.53
2 Real investment 0.00 -2.56 -2.35 -2.35 -2.35 -2.30 -2.27 -2.26 -2.25 -2.24 -2.23 -2.22 -2.21 -2.20 -2.18
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 0.38 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.16 -0.20
6 International exports 0.00 1.23 0.88 0.65 0.43 0.26 0.08 -0.10 -0.28 -0.44 -0.60 -0.75 -0.90 -1.03 -1.16
7 Interregional imports 0.00 -0.51 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.47 -0.45 -0.44 -0.43 -0.42 -0.41 -0.39 -0.38 -0.36 -0.35
8 International import volumes 0.00 -0.23 -0.32 -0.41 -0.50 -0.56 -0.64 -0.71 -0.79 -0.87 -0.94 -1.01 -1.08 -1.15 -1.21
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 -0.23 -0.34 -0.45 -0.55 -0.63 -0.72 -0.81 -0.89 -0.98 -1.06 -1.14 -1.21 -1.28 -1.35
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 -0.15 -0.28 -0.39 -0.50 -0.58 -0.67 -0.77 -0.86 -0.95 -1.03 -1.11 -1.19 -1.27 -1.34
11 Employment 0.00 -0.24 -0.35 -0.44 -0.53 -0.58 -0.64 -0.72 -0.79 -0.86 -0.93 -1.00 -1.06 -1.12 -1.18
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.32 -0.46 -0.60 -0.72 -0.84 -0.94 -1.05 -1.14 -1.23 -1.32 -1.40 -1.47
13 gdp deflator 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.26 0.36 0.44 0.51 0.58 0.64 0.69 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.90
14 CPI 0.00 -0.25 -0.07 0.05 0.16 0.27 0.35 0.43 0.50 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.77
15 Nominal wage 0.00 -0.29 -0.14 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.36
Selected NSW sectoral variables
16 Investment in dwellings 0.00 -9.63 -8.33 -7.89 -7.46 -7.04 -6.66 -6.32 -6.01 -5.73 -5.48 -5.26 -5.05 -4.87 -4.70
17 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05
18 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.24 -0.35 -0.44 -0.53 -0.58 -0.64 -0.72 -0.79 -0.86 -0.93 -1.00 -1.06 -1.12 -1.18
19 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.16 -0.23 -0.30 -0.37 -0.44 -0.51 -0.58 -0.65 -0.72 -0.79 -0.85
20 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.17 -0.26 -0.34 -0.42 -0.47 -0.54 -0.61 -0.69 -0.76 -0.83 -0.90 -0.97 -1.04 -1.10
21 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.55 -0.59 -0.62 -0.63 -0.59 -0.57 -0.57 -0.55 -0.54 -0.52 -0.50 -0.47 -0.44 -0.41
Selected national and rest-of-Australian macroeconomic impacts
22 National real wage 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.24 -0.29 -0.32 -0.35 -0.37 -0.39 -0.41 -0.42 -0.43 -0.44
23 National employment 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.11 -0.15 -0.19 -0.22 -0.25 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32 -0.33 -0.34 -0.35
25 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
26 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 0.15 0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.19 -0.25 -0.30 -0.35 -0.39 -0.43 -0.46 -0.48 -0.51 -0.5329
TABLE 2: PAYROLL FINANCING IMPACTS (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 -0.43 -0.57 -0.65 -0.71 -0.76 -0.81 -0.86 -0.90 -0.95 -0.99 -1.02 -1.06 -1.09 -1.12
2 Real investment 0.00 -1.37 -1.29 -1.28 -1.28 -1.27 -1.27 -1.28 -1.28 -1.29 -1.30 -1.31 -1.31 -1.32 -1.32
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.18 -0.21 -0.25 -0.28 -0.32 -0.35 -0.38 -0.41
6 International exports 0.00 0.26 0.09 -0.05 -0.17 -0.28 -0.39 -0.49 -0.60 -0.69 -0.79 -0.87 -0.96 -1.03 -1.10
7 Interregional imports 0.00 -0.46 -0.41 -0.37 -0.34 -0.31 -0.28 -0.26 -0.23 -0.21 -0.19 -0.17 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10
8 International import volumes 0.00 -0.51 -0.58 -0.63 -0.68 -0.72 -0.76 -0.81 -0.85 -0.90 -0.94 -0.98 -1.02 -1.06 -1.10
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 -0.33 -0.43 -0.49 -0.54 -0.58 -0.63 -0.67 -0.72 -0.76 -0.81 -0.85 -0.89 -0.93 -0.96
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 -0.29 -0.38 -0.44 -0.50 -0.54 -0.59 -0.63 -0.68 -0.72 -0.77 -0.81 -0.85 -0.89 -0.92
11 Employment 0.00 -0.45 -0.54 -0.58 -0.62 -0.64 -0.68 -0.71 -0.75 -0.79 -0.83 -0.87 -0.90 -0.94 -0.97
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.20 -0.28 -0.35 -0.42 -0.48 -0.53 -0.58 -0.63 -0.68 -0.72 -0.77 -0.80
13 gdp deflator 0.00 -0.22 -0.14 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21
14 CPI 0.00 -0.35 -0.26 -0.20 -0.16 -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07
15 Nominal consumer wage 0.00 -0.42 -0.38 -0.37 -0.36 -0.36 -0.35 -0.33 -0.32 -0.30 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 -0.23 -0.21
16 Nominal producer wage 0.00 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.43
Selected NSW sectoral variables
17 Investment in dwellings 0.00 -2.65 -2.64 -2.63 -2.56 -2.47 -2.37 -2.27 -2.19 -2.11 -2.04 -1.98 -1.92 -1.87 -1.83
18 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23
19 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.45 -0.54 -0.58 -0.62 -0.64 -0.68 -0.71 -0.75 -0.79 -0.83 -0.87 -0.90 -0.94 -0.97
20 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.19 -0.27 -0.33 -0.39 -0.44 -0.50 -0.55 -0.59 -0.64 -0.68 -0.72 -0.76
21 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.33 -0.42 -0.48 -0.52 -0.56 -0.60 -0.65 -0.69 -0.73 -0.78 -0.82 -0.86 -0.89 -0.93
22 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.88 -0.63 -0.49 -0.39 -0.31 -0.26 -0.22 -0.19 -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03
Selected national macroeconomic impacts
23 National real wage 0.00 -0.06 -0.12 -0.17 -0.20 -0.24 -0.26 -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29
24 National employment 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
26 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
27 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.1230
TABLE 3: DEBT  FINANCING IMPACTS (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13 -0.19 -0.24 -0.31 -0.37 -0.44 -0.51 -0.59 -0.67 -0.75 -0.84 -0.93
2 Real investment 0.00 -0.11 -0.21 -0.31 -0.42 -0.50 -0.60 -0.71 -0.81 -0.93 -1.04 -1.15 -1.26 -1.37 -1.48
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.16
6 International exports 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.12 -0.18 -0.25 -0.33 -0.41 -0.51 -0.60
7 Interregional imports 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23 -0.24 -0.26 -0.27 -0.28
8 International import volumes 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.19 -0.23 -0.28 -0.34 -0.40 -0.47 -0.54 -0.61 -0.69 -0.77 -0.85
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 -0.22 -0.27 -0.32 -0.38 -0.44 -0.51 -0.58 -0.65 -0.72
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.16 -0.20 -0.25 -0.30 -0.35 -0.41 -0.47 -0.54 -0.61 -0.68
11 Employment 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.17 -0.21 -0.26 -0.31 -0.37 -0.44 -0.51 -0.58 -0.65 -0.73 -0.81
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 -0.22 -0.27 -0.33 -0.38 -0.45 -0.51
13 gdp deflator 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
14 CPI 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08
15 Nominal consumer wage 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.16 -0.19 -0.22 -0.25 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.33 -0.35 -0.37
16 Nominal producer wage 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
Selected NSW sectoral variables
17 Investment in dwellings 0.00 -0.21 -0.41 -0.62 -0.83 -1.03 -1.22 -1.41 -1.60 -1.78 -1.96 -2.13 -2.29 -2.46 -2.61
18 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19
19 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.17 -0.21 -0.26 -0.31 -0.37 -0.44 -0.51 -0.58 -0.65 -0.73 -0.81
20 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.17 -0.21 -0.25 -0.30 -0.36 -0.41 -0.47
21 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.21 -0.26 -0.31 -0.36 -0.42 -0.49 -0.55 -0.62 -0.69
22 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 -0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21
Selected national macroeconomic impacts
23 National real wage 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22 -0.25 -0.27 -0.30
24 National employment 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08
26 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
27 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.0131
TABLE 4: RESIDENTIAL RATES FINANCING IMPACTS (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 -0.17 -0.30 -0.39 -0.48 -0.56 -0.63 -0.70 -0.77 -0.83 -0.89 -0.94 -0.99 -1.03 -1.07
2 Real investment 0.00 -1.63 -1.49 -1.51 -1.51 -1.48 -1.46 -1.45 -1.44 -1.43 -1.42 -1.41 -1.40 -1.39 -1.37
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 0.32 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.06
6 International exports 0.00 1.05 0.79 0.63 0.48 0.36 0.24 0.12 0.00 -0.11 -0.22 -0.32 -0.42 -0.51 -0.59
7 Interregional imports 0.00 -0.41 -0.39 -0.40 -0.40 -0.39 -0.38 -0.37 -0.37 -0.36 -0.35 -0.34 -0.33 -0.32 -0.31
8 International import volumes 0.00 -0.12 -0.19 -0.25 -0.31 -0.35 -0.39 -0.44 -0.49 -0.54 -0.58 -0.63 -0.67 -0.71 -0.75
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 -0.11 -0.19 -0.26 -0.33 -0.38 -0.43 -0.49 -0.54 -0.60 -0.65 -0.69 -0.74 -0.78 -0.82
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 -0.06 -0.16 -0.23 -0.30 -0.35 -0.41 -0.47 -0.53 -0.58 -0.64 -0.69 -0.74 -0.78 -0.83
11 Employment 0.00 -0.09 -0.19 -0.25 -0.31 -0.34 -0.38 -0.43 -0.48 -0.52 -0.57 -0.61 -0.65 -0.69 -0.72
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.20 -0.29 -0.38 -0.46 -0.53 -0.60 -0.67 -0.73 -0.78 -0.84 -0.89 -0.93
13 gdp deflator 0.00 -0.30 -0.18 -0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.32
14 CPI 0.00 -0.25 -0.12 -0.03 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.45
15 Nominal wage 0.00 -0.26 -0.15 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21
Selected NSW sectoral variables
16 Investment in dwellings 0.00 -6.31 -5.45 -5.21 -4.94 -4.67 -4.42 -4.18 -3.96 -3.77 -3.59 -3.43 -3.28 -3.14 -3.01
17 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04
18 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.09 -0.19 -0.25 -0.31 -0.34 -0.38 -0.43 -0.48 -0.52 -0.57 -0.61 -0.65 -0.69 -0.72
19 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.18 -0.23 -0.27 -0.32 -0.36 -0.40 -0.45 -0.49 -0.53
20 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.19 -0.24 -0.28 -0.32 -0.37 -0.41 -0.46 -0.50 -0.55 -0.59 -0.63 -0.67
21 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.35 -0.37 -0.39 -0.39 -0.37 -0.36 -0.35 -0.35 -0.34 -0.33 -0.31 -0.29 -0.28 -0.26
Selected national macroeconomic impacts
22 National real wage 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 -0.17 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23 -0.24 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.27
23 National employment 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.22 -0.23
25 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
26 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 -0.16 -0.19 -0.22 -0.24 -0.27 -0.28 -0.30 -0.3132
TABLE 5: CONSTRUCTION IMPACTS (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
2 Real investment 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 -0.31 -0.32 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 -0.32 -0.31 -0.30 -0.28 -0.27 -0.26 -0.24 -0.23 -0.22
6 International exports 0.00 -0.97 -0.94 -0.89 -0.83 -0.77 -0.71 -0.65 -0.60 -0.55 -0.50 -0.46 -0.42 -0.38 -0.35
7 Interregional imports 0.00 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.26
8 International import volumes 0.00 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
11 Employment 0.00 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13
13 gdp deflator 0.00 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
14 CPI 0.00 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
15 Nominal wage 0.00 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05
Selected NSW sectoral variables
16 Investment in dwellings 0.00 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.17
17 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
18 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19
19 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
20 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
21 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.40 0.28 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
Selected national and rest-of-Australian macroeconomic impacts
22 National real wage 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
23 National employment 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
25 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
26 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0033
TABLE 6: PRODUCTIVITY INCREASE (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.29 0.37 0.46 0.55 0.66 0.76 0.87 0.99 1.11 1.24
2 Real investment 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.23 0.36 0.46 0.59 0.73 0.87 1.02 1.18 1.33 1.49 1.65 1.81
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.45 0.52 0.60 0.68 0.77 0.86 0.95
6 International exports 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.49 0.64 0.80 0.96 1.14 1.32 1.51 1.70 1.91 2.12 2.33
7 Interregional imports 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15
8 International import volumes 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.62 0.75 0.88 1.02 1.16 1.31 1.47 1.63
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.37 0.47 0.58 0.70 0.82 0.95 1.08 1.22 1.37 1.52
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.37 0.47 0.58 0.69 0.82 0.94 1.08 1.22 1.36 1.52
11 Employment 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.58 0.67 0.75 0.85
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.54 0.63
13 gdp deflator 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16 -0.19 -0.23 -0.26 -0.30 -0.35 -0.39 -0.44 -0.49
14 CPI 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.16 -0.18 -0.21 -0.23 -0.26 -0.28
15 Nominal wage 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08
Selected NSW sectoral variables
16 Investment in dwellings 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.46 0.61 0.76 0.92 1.08 1.25 1.42 1.58 1.75 1.90 2.06
17 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20 -0.23 -0.26 -0.29 -0.33 -0.36 -0.40
18 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.58 0.67 0.75 0.85
19 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.41 0.50 0.59 0.68
20 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.37 0.48 0.58 0.70 0.83 0.96 1.09 1.23 1.38 1.53
21 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32
Selected national and rest-of-Australian macroeconomic impacts
22 National real wage 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.38
23 National employment 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13
25 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12
26 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.2334
TABLE 7: INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS UNDER DEVELOPER CHARGE FINANCING (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 -0.18 -0.24 -0.28 -0.32 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.32 -0.30 -0.26 -0.21 -0.15
2 Real investment 0.00 -2.40 -2.08 -1.96 -1.82 -1.66 -1.50 -1.35 -1.20 -1.04 -0.89 -0.73 -0.57 -0.41 -0.25
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.47 0.52
6 International exports 0.00 0.26 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.58 0.69 0.81
7 Interregional imports 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08
8 International import volumes 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.40 0.49 0.59
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.21 0.29
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.30
11 Employment 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.19 -0.15
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -0.28 -0.39 -0.48 -0.56 -0.63 -0.68 -0.71 -0.74 -0.75 -0.76 -0.75 -0.73
13 gdp deflator 0.00 0.27 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.44
14 CPI 0.00 -0.04 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
15 Nominal wage 0.00 -0.05 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.49
Selected NSW sectoral variables
16 Investment in dwellings 0.00 -9.43 -7.89 -7.27 -6.68 -6.12 -5.59 -5.11 -4.66 -4.25 -3.86 -3.50 -3.17 -2.85 -2.56
17 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 -0.12 -0.15 -0.18 -0.21 -0.24 -0.27 -0.29 -0.32 -0.35 -0.38 -0.40 -0.43
18 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.19 -0.15
19 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05
20 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.56
21 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.16 -0.24 -0.28 -0.29 -0.27 -0.25 -0.24 -0.22 -0.20 -0.19 -0.17 -0.15 -0.13 -0.11
Selected national and rest-of-Australian macroeconomic impacts
22 National real wage 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02
23 National employment 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22
25 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
26 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 -0.19 -0.22 -0.25 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30 -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.3035
TABLE 8: INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS UNDER PAYROLL FINANCING (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 -0.27 -0.33 -0.34 -0.33 -0.31 -0.28 -0.24 -0.19 -0.13 -0.06 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.27
2 Real investment 0.00 -1.20 -1.01 -0.87 -0.74 -0.61 -0.48 -0.35 -0.22 -0.09 0.05 0.19 0.34 0.48 0.63
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 -0.31 -0.30 -0.27 -0.23 -0.20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.32
6 International exports 0.00 -0.71 -0.68 -0.60 -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.18 -0.06 0.08 0.22 0.37 0.52 0.69 0.86
7 Interregional imports 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32
8 International import volumes 0.00 -0.31 -0.29 -0.25 -0.20 -0.14 -0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.47 0.58 0.70
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 -0.21 -0.21 -0.18 -0.14 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.27 0.37 0.47 0.58 0.69
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 -0.16 -0.17 -0.14 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.50 0.61 0.73
11 Employment 0.00 -0.26 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 -0.27 -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.15 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.06
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.15 -0.20 -0.23 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.19 -0.15 -0.11 -0.05
13 gdp deflator 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.18 -0.22 -0.26
14 CPI 0.00 -0.14 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20
15 Nominal consumer wage 0.00 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09
16 Nominal producer wage 0.00 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.56
Selected NSW sectoral variables
17 Investment in dwellings 0.00 -2.44 -2.16 -1.95 -1.72 -1.48 -1.24 -1.00 -0.78 -0.57 -0.36 -0.16 0.03 0.20 0.37
18 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15
19 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.26 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 -0.27 -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.15 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.06
20 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 0.05
21 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.19 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.05 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.51 0.62 0.74
22 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 -0.48 -0.27 -0.15 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26
Selected national macroeconomic impacts
23 National real wage 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12
24 National employment 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02
26 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07
27 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.1236
TABLE 9: INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS UNDER DEBT FINANCING (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.46
2 Real investment 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.45
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 -0.31 -0.26 -0.21 -0.15 -0.09 -0.02 0.05 0.12 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.49 0.57
6 International exports 0.00 -0.95 -0.75 -0.54 -0.33 -0.13 0.06 0.24 0.42 0.59 0.76 0.92 1.07 1.22 1.37
7 Interregional imports 0.00 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13
8 International import volumes 0.00 0.16 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.46 0.53 0.59 0.66 0.73 0.80 0.87 0.95
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.78 0.85 0.93
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.46 0.53 0.60 0.67 0.74 0.81 0.89 0.97
11 Employment 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.24
13 gdp deflator 0.00 0.27 0.19 0.11 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.16 -0.20 -0.24 -0.27 -0.31 -0.34 -0.38
14 CPI 0.00 0.19 0.11 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.21 -0.24 -0.27 -0.29 -0.32 -0.35
15 Nominal consumer wage 0.00 0.21 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24
16 Nominal producer wage 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.58 0.63
Selected NSW sectoral variables
17 Investment in dwellings 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.14 -0.19 -0.24 -0.28 -0.32 -0.36 -0.40 -0.43
18 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19
19 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22
20 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.34
21 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.40 0.46 0.53 0.60 0.67 0.74 0.82 0.90 0.98
22 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.33 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08
Selected national macroeconomic impacts
23 National real wage 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12
24 National employment 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05
26 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
27 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.2237
TABLE 10: INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS UNDER RESIDENTIAL RATES FINANCING (percentage deviations from basecase values)
NSW Macroeconomic Impacts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 Real consumption 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.32
2 Real investment 0.00 -1.47 -1.22 -1.11 -0.98 -0.83 -0.69 -0.54 -0.39 -0.23 -0.08 0.08 0.24 0.40 0.56
3 Real state government consumption 0.00 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48
4 Real federal government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Interregional exports 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.40 0.46 0.52 0.59 0.67
6 International exports 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.24 0.33 0.43 0.54 0.66 0.79 0.92 1.07 1.22 1.38
7 Interregional imports 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11
8 International import volumes 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.52 0.61 0.71 0.82 0.93 1.05
9 Real GDP (market prices) 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.52 0.61 0.72 0.83
10 Real GDP (factor cost) 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.52 0.61 0.71 0.82
11 Employment 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.31
12 Capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.16 -0.22 -0.26 -0.30 -0.32 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 -0.30 -0.27 -0.23 -0.19
13 gdp deflator 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14
14 CPI 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18
15 Nominal wage 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34
Selected NSW sectoral variables
16 Investment in dwellings 0.00 -6.11 -5.00 -4.57 -4.14 -3.73 -3.33 -2.95 -2.60 -2.26 -1.95 -1.65 -1.37 -1.10 -0.84
17 Basic price, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20 -0.23 -0.27 -0.30 -0.33 -0.36 -0.39 -0.42
18 Employment, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.31
19 Capital stock, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.28
20 Output, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.42 0.50 0.59 0.68 0.78 0.89 1.00
21 Rental price of capital, non-dwelling sector 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Selected national macroeconomic impacts
22 National real wage 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.15
23 National employment 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 National capital stock 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10
25 National non-dwellings capital stock 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07
26 Basic price, non-dwelling sector, RoA 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.0838
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